{"numero_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_sha256": "c6b535f7e5b9a04e5e21103f00df16df07c2caca3eda634f15357229c15201ec", "source_tei": "https://github.com/Princeton-CDH/bluemountain-transcriptions/blob/main/periodicals/bmtnaay/issues/1924_02/bmtnaay_1924_02.tei.xml", "source_mets": "https://github.com/pulibrary/BlueMountain/blob/main/metadata/periodicals/bmtnaay/issues/1924_02/bmtnaay_1924_02.mets.xml", "url_numero": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02", "articles": [{"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c002", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c002", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "1", "page_fin": "1", "image_debut": 2, "image_fin": 2, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.2", "titre_corps": "CONTENTS", "titre_sommaire": "CONTENTS", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 2, "page_imprimee": "1", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.2", "debut_caractere": 75, "fin_caractere_exclue": 441, "texte": "CONTENTS\nForeword i\nSection I. ........ c\nDefinition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.\nSection 11. ..... ..... 7\nTypes of Perception.\nSection 111. ......... 8\nTypes of the Image and anti-Image.\nSection IV. . . . . . . 17\nUpon the Nature of Words and their Use.\nSection V. ....... ... 18\nUpon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c003", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c003", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "1", "page_fin": "5", "image_debut": 2, "image_fin": 6, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.3", "titre_corps": "FOREWORD.", "titre_sommaire": "FOREWORD.", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 2, "page_imprimee": "1", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.2", "debut_caractere": 443, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1607, "texte": "FOREWORD.\nThese notes presuppose a knowledge of Fenollosa's The Chinese Written Character, a\nlarge part of T. S. Eliot s The Sacred Wood, and scattered paragraphs from Pound, Lewis, Croce,\nand the Hindus.\nI reserve the right to add to or alter these notes later in case of any second publication.\nIt is possible that they are not complete (the last section is obviously incomplete, as my interest in\nit is temporarily secondary), but ihey are an attempt to incite the beginnings of a scientific criti-\ncism of poetry, which up to dale we do not have, except in a few scattered fragments.\nThe poet himself will be more sensitive to, or more moved\nby, some material than other material, will perceive it more com-\npletely, and so will write his best poems when dealing with it.\nSpeculation upon the sensitivity of the individual poet and its\npossible modification by his environment is of some psycholo-\ngical interest and perhaps more ((human interest)), but it has\nlittle to do with the art of poetry. The degree of fusion of the\nparts of a poem will depend upon the degree of fusion of the poet\nwith his material, and that, to be sure, is the result of the nature"}, {"page_pdf": 3, "page_imprimee": "2", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.3", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2397, "texte": "of his sensitivity and his environment. But one is usually — and\ntheoretically — forced by circumstances to approach the poet and\nhis environment — if one so desires — through his poems, and\nnot the other way round. Supposing one to be possessed of some\nintelligence, it is possible, after a reasonable amount of study, to\ndecide whether a poem represent a perfect fusion of perceptions\nor not, and supposing one to have some education, it is possible,\nafter similar study, to decide whether the poem be original or me-\nrely a restatement of the perceptions of others. As different poets\nare moved equally by different types of material, finished poems,\ncomposed of different types of material, may be equally intense;\nthus indicating that the material is of no importance to the critic,\nwho is dealing with poems; but only to the poet, who is dealing\nwith material, and that is his own affair.\nThe cause of a perfectly fused poem is the fusion of the poet s\nconsciousness with an object or a group of objects of whatever na-\nture. The means by which this fusion is achieved is the poet s\n((technique)). In the mature poet, the technique is the medium of\nfusion; and the ratio of what the poet sees or feels to what he\ngets down is in direct proportion to the perfection of his techni-\nque. Why one poet is moved by this and another by that, it is\nimpossible to say. It is possible only to remark the fact. But tech-\nnique can be analysed, and analysed minutely; and this analysis\nmay be of value to other poets in perfecting and extending the\nrange of their perceptions, and it may be of value to critics, private\nand public, insofar as it may make them more acutely aware of\ntheir poets' achievements.\nA poem is a state of perfection at which a poet has arrived\nby whatever means. It is a stasis in a world of flux and indecision,\na permanent gateway to waking oblivion, which is the only in-\nfinity and the only rest. It has no responsibilities except to itself\nand its own perfection — neither to the man who may come to it\nwith imperfect understanding nor to the mood from which it may\noriginally have sprung. It is not a means to any end, but is in\nitself an end, and it, or one of the other embodiments of beauty,\nis the only end possible to the man of intellect.\nThe artist whose deity is art, has a religion as valid and as\ncapable of producing great art as any religion of the past or as"}, {"page_pdf": 4, "page_imprimee": "3", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.4", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2148, "texte": "the recently defined religion of money. As a conscious and intel-\nligent being, no other religion will be possible for him, and he\ncannot, because of his religion, be called a decadent, an heretic.\nDriven into a corner of which we are unaware, we pursue our\nends. For in infinity, those who withdraw in terror are those who\ndrive us off with bitterness, and at the same instant, in the same\nthought and gesture. Yet equanimity is all we seek.\nA poem is the result of a poet moving in a millieu. A poet\nis born into a certain intellectual and physical milieu, and this\nmilieu may, to some extent, form the poet. But the poet will also\nbe born with certain peculiar and unchangeable qualities, and\nthese will, in the course of time, modify the milieu with respect\nto the particular poet. If the poet be of a very plastic nature, he\nmay be greatly changed by his milieu. If he be of a more or less\nimmobile nature, he will absorb into his own mind, and, in the\nprocess of obsorption, change as becomes necessary, such part of\nhis milieu as is to some extent forced upon him.\nA poet's technique is a portion of the milieu into which he\nis born (tradition) modified by his peculiar qualities to serve their\nneeds.\nThe milieu of any place and time is a relatively constant\nfactor. The peculiar qualities of individual poets are infinitely va-\nriable. The resulting milieu of the individual poet is therefore\ninfinitely variable. So it is infantile to say that a poet (( does not\ninterpret his time », to demand that he write in any specified man-\nner. It is infantile to say that he can do this or that only with this\nor that technique. The individual can only say truly, « I can do\nthis or that only with this or that technique». And even then\nhe cannot be too sure.\nSo that the poem can be judged, not in relation to any time\nor place, nor to any mode of thought, but to itself alone, and as a\npart of literature; for it is not a means, but an end. The mind\nthat can judge a poem accurately is very rare — even more rare\nthan the mind that can create a poem. For this act of weighing\nrequires a mind infinitely balanced, infinitely sensitive, and infi-"}, {"page_pdf": 5, "page_imprimee": "4", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.5", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2280, "texte": "nitely familiar with all the technical phases of the medium. Such\na mind is, with one exception in a thousand, the mind of the\nmaster poet.\nThe intellectual poet is often accused of obscurity, merely\nbecause his reader is unfamiliar with the milieu in which he\nmoves. If we imagine a poet writing in our own language but\non a remote planet, whose vegetation and population, whose en-\ntire physical aspect, are different from anything we know, and ex-\npressing himself largely in terms of the physical, we cannot ima-\ngine ourselves receiving from his poems more than a very blurred\nimpression. So is the poet moving in a world that is largely com-\nposed of thought and otherwise greatly modified by thought, to\nthe reader unacquainted with the philosophies.\nThe poet moving in a world that is largely thought, so long\nas he regard it curiously and as a world, perceives a grassblade.\nThese specific things are the material of the image, of art. When\nhe loses his sense of the infinite nature of his world and organizes\nit into a knowable and applicable principle, he loses sight of the\nparticulars themselves and sees their relationships to each other\nand his newly-created whole ; and so becomes a philosopher; for\nit is only in the infinite that the particular can be detected as a\ncomplete and uncoordinated whole; but he may still have oc-\ncasional perceptions, and at times revert to the poet. When he\nbecomes more interested in the application of his principle, in its\npossible effects, than in the principle itself, he becomes a preacher\nand is lost; for now he not only thinks in generalities instead of\nin perceptions, but he attempts to save a humanity that he cannot\npossibly understand by fitting it into a mutilated fragment of an\ninfinity whose nature he once felt, but could never understand,\nand has now forgotten.\nThe poet, in creating, must lose himself in his object. If he\nbecomes more interested in himself observing than in his object,\nand still continues to write about his object rather than himself\nobserving, he will create a mannerism but no image. It is from\nthis weakness that the various familiar pretty and paternal man-\nnerisms arise. Such a mannerism may be held down to the point\nof producing poetry of whatever degree of impurity, or it may not."}, {"page_pdf": 6, "page_imprimee": "5", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.6", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1641, "texte": "The poet who is preoccupied with his object desires a speech\nwithout idiom and a style without mannerism, that the clarity of\nhis perception may not be clouded by inessentials. In any abso-\nlute sense, both are impossible, but both can be closely approxi-\nmated.\nPerhaps it is true that the poet, moving through his world,\nreaches, for chemical or other reasons, a point of spiritual in-\ntensity, and that those objects that fall under his eye or his mind's\neye at this point are transformed into something simpler and\ngreater than actuality, withor without his consciousness of any\nsequence save the actual sequence of their appearance; that the\nreproduction of this simplification in words will reproduce in the\nreader the original emotion or point of intensity. Perhaps it is\ntrue that the poet, moving throught his world, becomes aware of\nbeautiful existences, and being moved by them to a sufficient point\nof intensity, is able to reproduce them in words with sufficient ac-\ncuracy to create in his reader the emotion which they created in\nhim. Or perhaps, and this is probably nearer to the truth, he is\nsufficiently moved by certain beautiful existences, to be able to\ncreate other beautiful existences ; and this approaches T. S. Eliot's\nanalogy of the catalyst, and his ((significant emotion)), which is\nprobably the only sound statement of the creative process that\nwe have.\nAll functions of man save the creation of art and pure though\ntend to complicate his physical life without simplifying his mlental\nlife. The sciences, as abstractions, might have the same value\nas art. Indescriminately applied, they have wrecked the world."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c004", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c004", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "5", "page_fin": "7", "image_debut": 6, "image_fin": 8, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.4", "titre_corps": "Definition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.", "titre_sommaire": "Definition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 6, "page_imprimee": "5", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.6", "debut_caractere": 1643, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2046, "texte": "SECTION I.\nDefinition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.\nIt has been said that art is an elimination of the superfluous,\nbut this statement is capable of several interpretations. It is cer-\ntain, however, that the poetic image is an elimination of the su-\nperfluous in a definite and fundamental sense. Everyone of wha-\ntever degree of intelligence, walking about the world, sees certain"}, {"page_pdf": 7, "page_imprimee": "6", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.7", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2328, "texte": "things : trees growing, their leaves and branches moving in the\nwind; bees flying across fields; men and women working in the\nfields or walking in the streets or moved by various passions and\nemotions. These sights and others of a similar nature may be\ncalled observation. If I say : « I saw a man walking », or : « 1 saw\nnight come », it will convey no sharp or lasting impression to the\nbrain of the listener. It is a general statement, which is a vague\nstatement, like a mist without form, a block of unhewn granite,\na chaos.\nBut there are persons who see those things which differen-\ntiate one observation from another : they see the outline in the\nmist. The vision of this outline may be called perception. And\nthere are yet other persons, fewer in number and of finer vision,\nwho can take the outline from the mist and make it stand alone.\nThis is done, in poetry, by seeing and placing in juxtaposition two\nor more observations that have one quality in common : that is,\neach of these observations will be differentiated from other obser-\nvations of its class by the same perception; and when these obser-\nvations are placed together they will fuse at the point where they\nare the same, or, to be more exact, they will be the same at one\npoint. These two perceptions, coming together with an almost\ninfinite speed across the mental distances that naturally lie bet-\nween two separate obserbations (such as a man walking and the\nccmmg of night) cause a kind of mental vibration that is known as\naesthetic emotion. Or, to state it in another fashion, this fusion,\ncr sameness at one point in two observations, reinforces that point,\nand makes it stand out as clearly above the vaguenesses of the\ntwo observations as those two observations stand out above a state\nof no-observation or unconsciousness. And perhaps these two sta-\ntements of the phenomenon are not incompatible. This phenome-\nnon may be called an image. The image, in the case of the two\nobservations used as examples, is :\nAt one stride comes the darli.\nThe quotation may help to clear the ground.\nThe image, so defined, being a fusion of sense-perceptions,\npresents the emotion : that is, the emotion is seen in the concrete\nand acts directly, without the aid of thought, just as the sight\nof a tree registers directly, without the aid of thought. But it is"}, {"page_pdf": 8, "page_imprimee": "7", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.8", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1895, "texte": "possible in thinking of observations, to find intellectual correla-\ntions that are not evident to the simple senses, but that may\ntransmit an aesthetic emotion, not directly, as in the case of sense\nperceptions, but through the intellect. Here the emotion is trans-\nmitted by intercomment, rather than by fusion. This phenomenon\nmay be called the anti-image, as the sense-impressions of the\nobservations do not here fuse at any point. It will be noted that\nthe anti-image, where a physical fusion is not intended, is dif-\nferent from an attempted image, or fusion of sense-perceptions\nthat is not successful.\nAs the image and anti-image make a sharp and lasting im-\npression on the brain, and as the simple observation does not,\nthe image and anti-image stay, and the observations disappear;\nand this is the process of elimination that was alluded to above.\nIt is that quality in an observation of the approach of night that\nis different from any other observation of the approach of night,\nthat gives such an observation a life of its own. And it is this\ndifferentiating, or unique, quality in any observation, that, when\npresented permanently, by means of an image or anti-image, is\nknown as beauty.\nThe terms, observation, perception, and image, may have\nbeen used at various times with meanings slightly different from\nthose I have given them ; but I have applied them to certain phe-\nnomena, defined as clearly as I can define them, for lack of better\nterms. The phenomena seem to me sufficiently distinguishable\nfrom one another. It may be argued that a perception, as I have\ndefined it, does not really exist until it becomes an image; but\nthis possibility can be taken into consideration without disturbing\nthe trend of my discussion. The anti-image is the only pure lo-\ngopeia ; but as the term logopeia has been applied in ways that\ndo not seem to me accurate, I shall not here use it."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c005", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c005", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "7", "page_fin": "8", "image_debut": 8, "image_fin": 9, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.5", "titre_corps": "Types of Perception.", "titre_sommaire": "Types of Perception.", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 8, "page_imprimee": "7", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.8", "debut_caractere": 1897, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2171, "texte": "SECTION II.\nTypes of Perception.\nPerceptions may be divided into two general types : those\nperceptions which are expressed in the sound of words, and those\nperceptions which are expressed in the meaning of words.\nThe first of these types will be referred to in this essay as"}, {"page_pdf": 9, "page_imprimee": "8", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.9", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1088, "texte": "sound-perceptions. Sound perceptions possess two qualities : tone\nand rhythm. The first of these is the quality of individual vowel\nor consonant or syllabic sounds. The second is the rate and va-\nriation of movement from tone to tone. It will be seen that tone\nand rhythm are inseparable, but occasionally one or the other\nseems to predominate. This results from a perfect or nearly perfect\nfusion of the predominant sound quality with the meaning of the\nwords, and an imperfect fusion of the other sound quality. Insofar\nas this is true of any poem, that poem will be imperfect.\nPerfections which are expressed in the meaning of words\nmay be called meaning-perceptions. They fall roughly into two\nclasses : perceptions of concrete facts of which one becomes aware\nthrough the simple senses, and which may be called sense-percep-\ntions; and perceptions of abstract facts or qualities — that is, of\nfacts or qualities which are imperceptible to the unaided senses —\nof which one becomes aware through thinking about a concrete\nor abstract fact, and which may be called thought-perceptions."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c006", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c006", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "8", "page_fin": "17", "image_debut": 9, "image_fin": 18, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.6", "titre_corps": "Types of the Image and anti-Image.", "titre_sommaire": "Types of the Image and anti-Image.", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 9, "page_imprimee": "8", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.9", "debut_caractere": 1090, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1955, "texte": "SECTION III.\nTypes of the Image and anti-Image.\n1.\nThere is the simple physical movement, not «caught» in\nany fusion of the meaning of words, but rather in a fusion of the\nsound of words and a simple statement of the movement — in\nthe fusion of the sound perception and a simple meaning percep-\ntion. The movement has no necessary connotations as a move-\nment : that is, it is not a movement one thinks of as having any\nrelationship to sorrow, joy, or ecstasy. But any unemotional phys-\nical movement, stated cleanly and in psychological order, in a\nrhythm that fuses with that movement, may become a profound\nimage. By fusing with the movement, 1 do not mean that the\nrhythm should imitate with its own movement the physical mo-\nvement that it contains, bu* rather that it should purify that mo-\nvement as it appears in actual physical life, giving it a regularity"}, {"page_pdf": 10, "page_imprimee": "9", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.10", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2491, "texte": "or at least organized variation of beat, and usually greatly acce-\nlerating it; so that the movement takes on something of the na\nture of a dance movement, but again is much purer and swifter\nthan even a dance movement, by nature of its limitations, can be.\nFrom this last it may be seen that a movement that has been\npurified and formalized to a certain extent in actual life, such as\na dance or religious procession, and which has, therefore, a certain\nemotional connotation in itself, can be further formalized, purified,\nin a poem, so that it takes on a new significance — even if that\nnew significance be only a variation upon the purification already\neffected in the dance or religious procession. There are also mo-\nvements in actual life that are expressions or semi-expression of\nemotion, such as joy, sorrow, etc., and these may, as well as\nother movements, be given form simply by a rhythm ; but the\ndanger here lies in the temptation offered to the weak, at least,\nto be content with a lax rhythm and to trust to the connotations\nof the movement to <( put hover » the emotion ; which is akin to\nthe use of an inherited symbolism or any other sentimentality.\nThe pure form of this type of image, that is, the physical move-\nment without connotations, animated merely by a rhythm, is apt\nto produce the cleanest beauty. The last-named form of the image\nseems to me the least desirable, as it cannot possibly be freed from\nat least a taint of sentimentality, though this taint, in certain cases\nand if handled by a master, may have a value.\nWe may, for lack of a shorter name, call the type of image\ndiscussed in the last paragraph, the simple physical movement\nfused with a rhythm. This image seems to occur most often in\nrhymed poems that move to a fixed metre. There seems to be a\ncumulative effect, sometimes, in the still-echoing rhythm of se-\nveral preceding stanzas. The same cumulative effect may come\nin poems whose metre varies as much as or less than, say, that\nof the Ancient Mariner. It would, I should think, be difficult to\nproduce this cumulative effect in a meter not having a large\namount of repetition; and certainly the reinforcement of rhyme\nis an aid; but the use of the simple physical movement fused with\na rhythm does not depend upon cumulative rhythm. Cumulative\nrhythm is merely a possible modification, or, sometimes, intensi-\nfication.\nTwo of the finest examples of this image that I know —\nexamples of the physical movement without, in itself, any emo-"}, {"page_pdf": 11, "page_imprimee": "10", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.11", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1326, "texte": "tional connotations — are in the openin of T. Gautier's Les Affres\nde la Mort:\nO toi qui passes par ce cloitre,\nSonge a la mort! — Tun est pas sur\nDe Voir s'allonger et decroitre,\nUne autre jois, ton ombre au mur.\nbrere, peut-etre cette dalle\nQu'aujourd'hui, sans songer aux morts,\nTu soufflettes de ta sandale,\nDemain pesera sur ton corps !\nThe physical movement here is in the first, third, and fourth\nlines of the first stanza, and in the third line of the second stanza.\nThese lines are slightly modified from without by the « Songe a\nla mort! », but the modification is slight and not such as to cloud\ntheir value as examples. Another example of this type of image\nin one of its less pure forms is to be found in the latter half of\nGerard Hopkins' The Habit of Perfection:\nO feel-of-primrose hands, O feet\nThat want the yield of plushy sward,\nBut you shall wal\\ the golden street,\nAnd you unhouse and house the Lord.\nThe last two lines show the purification in verse of a move-\nment that has already been purified in life as a religious symbol.\nH. D. has achieved in free verse animations of physical move-\nments that have no emotional connotations :\n/ saw the first pear\nas it fell —\nthe honey-seeding, golden-banded,\nthe yellow swarm\nwas not more fleet than I,\n(spare us from loveliness)\nand I fell prostrate\ncrying:..."}, {"page_pdf": 12, "page_imprimee": "11", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.12", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1692, "texte": "The movement of the first two lines has in itself no emo-\ntional connotation whatever, the movement of the next three lines\nhas infinitely little, and the movement of the seventh and eigth\nIms have a very definite one. All three are handled successfully\nand have their place in the poem.\nThe simple physical movement fused with a rhythm is the\ncommonest variation of the simple physical fact fused with a\nrhythm, which may or may not have movement. This image\nneed not be visual.\n1 .a.\nThe statement of simple thought, or the statement of\na simple physical fact, punctuated or commented upon by a\nrhythm, is the simplest form of what Pound has roughly classed\nas logopeia, and of what I have called the anti-image. A rhythm\nthat has traditional associations, or innate (i.e., more remote\nor not immediately obviously traditional) associations, or one that\nhas acquired associations in the given poem, by previous fusion,\nmay comment upon its meaning-content either by contrast or\naugmentation. It will be seen that each type of image has its\nconverse, or anti-image, and this first type of anti-image is the\nconverse of the simple physical fact fused with a rhythm. La-\nforgue achieves this anti-image by putting a ridiculous fact into\na traditionally plaintive metre, or by putting a sentimental or tragic\nfact into a ridiculous metre, or by various shadings between these\ntwo extremes. The result is one phase of his rather mournful\nsatire :\nAllez, sterile ritournelles,\nLa vie est Vraie et criminelle.\n2.\nThe second type of image is the complex physical fact\nfused with a rhythm. This is the same as the first type of image,\nexcept that here the fusion is between two or more sense-percep-"}, {"page_pdf": 13, "page_imprimee": "12", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.13", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1947, "texte": "tions and one sound-perception. The line quoted in Section I of\nthese notes belonged to this type of image, and also the third,\nfourth, and fifth lines of the quotation from H. D. (if taken as a\nunit). There are various devices for constructing an image of this\nsort, some of which I shall describe, that the image, when come\nupon, may be the more easily recognized.\nFirst: The direct comparison of sense-perceptions, as in the\nso-called metaphor and simile. The line quoted in Section I is of\nthis nature.\nSecond : The putting of two sense-perceptions in sequence,\nso that while they have no direct or grammatically indicated con-\nnection with each other, each reflects upon the other because of\nthe quality they have in common :\nSo wore night; the East was gray;\nWhite the broadfaced hemlock flowers—\nMovements may be similarly put into sequence :\nAnd Neptune made for thee a spumy tent,\nAnd Pan made sing for thee his forest hive,\nHere the first line is a fusion two sense-perceptions with one\nsound-perception, and the movement of the sound-perception,\ncarrying with it an echo of the «spumy tent», holds over and\ndies into the movement of the humming bees.\nThird : An adjective, being a generalization taken from a\nseries of more or less related observations, may, if appleid to a\nmore or less remote observation, effect a fusion. This is the «trans-\nferred epithet » of rethoric :\nthe parakeet —\ntrivial and humdrum on examination\nFourth : It is perhaps not amiss to mention a certain fallacy\nfairly common to a large number of secondrate but occasionally\ngood poets when they attempt to use this image. That fallacy is\nan attempt to give existence in that which we perceive as space\nto a perception that has no such existence, and to fuse this per-\nception with that side of a second perception which actually exists\nin space. Or, to speak more concretely, to fuse, in the meaning\nof words, a perception of sound and some visual perception,"}, {"page_pdf": 14, "page_imprimee": "13", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.14", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2180, "texte": "usually color. Now it seems that certain persons do sense a re-\nlationship between colors and sounds, but it is also certain that\nmany of the persons who do so, disagree among themselves as\nto the details of this relationship. And even if it were possible\nto find an absolute ration, mathematical or perceptive, between\nsound waves, which move slowly through the air, and the hypo-\nthetical (and doubtful) light waves which move with terrific rapi-\ndity through an imponderable substance known as ether, it would\nnot necessarily follow that related emotions would be produced\nby related waves, for these waves are perceived through entirely\ndifferent organs, and the organs of perception are obviously factors\nof the emotion. Furthermore, as I have already inferred, sound\nas We perceive it, has no existence in space, but only in time, or\nwhat we perceive as time; for it is only that which is seen that\ncan be said to fill space, which is a purely visual concept. But\nthe visual, if it have existence in space, has also existence in time,\nand this existence is more evident if the visual perception have\nmotion, which is a relation between space and time, and still\nmore evident if that motion have rhythm, which is time consciously\nbroken up and organized with respect to those existences and their\nintervals that it contains. Now sound, having existence in time,\ncan also have rhythm. So it follows that whereas the auditory and\nthe visual will have no common ground in that which we know as\nspace, they will have a common ground in that which we know\nas time, and that common ground is rhythm — the actual rhythm\nof the thing perceived, and not the rhythm of the words contain-\ning the thing. Now if an auditory and a visual rhythm be stated\nin the meaning of words, a fusion may be possible :\nAnd li\\e a giant harp that hums\nOn always, and is always blending\nThe coming of what never comes\nWith what has past and had an ending,\nThe City trembles, throbs, and pounds\nOutside, and through a thousand sounds\nThe small intolerable drums\nOf Time are li\\e slow drops descending.\nHere the rhythm of the sound of the « drums of Time » and\nthe rhythm of the motion of the drops fuse."}, {"page_pdf": 15, "page_imprimee": "14", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.15", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1611, "texte": "It must be recollected that in speaking of the rhythm of a\nsound, or rather of sounds, in this connection, 1 do not refer to\nthe rhythm of sound waves, which belong to science and not to\nunaided human perception; but I refer to the rhythm or rate of\nmovement from sound to sound, as those sounds actually strike,\nor may be imagined to strike, the ear. And similarly, I refer to\nactual visual perception of rhythm and not to the rhythm of\nlight waves, which is imperceptible, as such, to the eye.\n2.a.\nThe anti-image corresponding to the complex physical fact\nfused with a rhythm is of four possible sorts. In the first sort,\nthat of two thought-perceptions and one sound perception, a fu-\nsion of the thought-perceptions is possible, as they are of the\nsame substance. But these thought perceptions, having no phy-\nsical existence, cannot fuse, but can only comment upon each\nother through the mind. The only example of this variation upon\nthe second anti-image that I can find at present is in a poem of\nmy own :\nWe perish, we\nWho die in art,\nWith that surprise\nOf one who speaks\nTo us, and knows\nWherein he lies.\nThe second variation upon this anti-image is composed of\none sense-perception, one thought-perception, and one sound-\nperception intercommenting :\nStreets that follow li\\e a tedious argument\nOf insidious intent,\nTo lead you to an overwhelming question.\nThe third variation is of two sense-perceptions which may\nor may not fuse, and one sound-perception that comments. The\nfourth variation is composed of two remotely separate facts, at\nleast one of which must be physical and which fuses with the"}, {"page_pdf": 16, "page_imprimee": "15", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.16", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1461, "texte": "rhythm and takes on an image existence of its own, as in the case\nof the simple physical fact fused with a rhythm. The unfused\nfact comments. This is som,!stimes known as the conceit. An\nexample of the conceit is Donne's comparison of two souls to a\npair of compasses, toward the end of the Valediction Forbidding\nMourning.\n3.\nThere is a third type of image that seems to fall about half-\nway between the first and second types that I have defined.\nThis image is composed of two physical facts, each fused with\nthe sound, and, while neither fused with each other nor com-\nmenting upon each other, altering and defining each other's value\nquite definitely, simply by the juxtaposition of their physical qua-\nlities or by the action of the one upon the other :\nThe maidens taste\nAnd stray impassioned in the littering leaves.\nThe straying maidens and the littering leaves are here the\nphysical facts. They have no point in common, as had the walking\nman and the approaching night of the first example, but they\ndo fuse into a single movement, a single image, of which the\nsound of the whole is a part. And by that fusion, each is sharply\nlimited, separated from the general.\n3.a.\nThe corresponding anti-image is of two thought-perceptions\nplaced together, and the one acting upon the other, to such\nan extent as to effect the defining of both, without any attempt\nat fusion or intercomment at one point :\nthe future of time is determined by the power of volition."}, {"page_pdf": 17, "page_imprimee": "16", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.17", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2197, "texte": "4.\nA perception — almost invariably a sense-perception — that\nhas acquired, by long association or by personal association\nor by personal association for whatever period of time, an emo-\ntional overtone or symbolic value, may be used in a poem, so\nlong as it be given in the poem a new existence as image or anti-\nimage. If the fusion or intercomment necessary to this existence\nbe not achieved, the symbolic value of the perception is useless as\nthe perception is without life. If, however, the perception be given\nthis existence, the symbolism may augment the emotion of the\nimage considerably, and the emotion resulting from the symbolism\ncan scarcely be separated in the mind from the emotion resulting\nfrom the image. The symbolical overtone is more or less analagous\nto what is known in painting as ((literary)) beauty.\nThere are symbols in literature whose symbolic value is evi-\ndent, and there are those whose symbolic value is only in pare\nevident, and still others the mere existence of whose symbolic\nvalue is only implied. Glenway Wescott once wrote in a letter:\n<(the legitimate field of movement clearly seen, intention un-\nknown ».\nSymbolism is commonly thought of as something vaguely\nmetaphysical, but it need not be. Any fact or object which sums\nup or evokes any set of conditions or emotions, whatever their\nnature, is to some extent a symbol. Thus T. S. Eliot s Sweeny is\nsymbolic of a certain type of ugliness, Rachel nee Rabinovitch\nand the rest are symbolic of certain smaller divisions of that\nugliness. Mr. Eliot gives movements to these figures that are very\noften of a quite impersonal nature — that is, they are movements\nthat are in no wise connected with their ugliness or are presented\nwith a curious detachment from their ugliness; and these mo-\nvements are usually of supreme sinuosity and beauty. So that,\nby placing these symbols of ugliness in contrast to the impersonal\nbeauty of the movements of their flesh, he achieves at a single\nstroke the functions of the image and the anti-image — some-\nthing that hovers between satire and agony.\nThe symbol must not be confused with the physical move-\nment having emotional connotations, or expressing emotion ; for"}, {"page_pdf": 18, "page_imprimee": "17", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.18", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 351, "texte": "the latter is concerned with specific instonces only, while the\nformer is expressive of a concept or whole field of emotion, such\nas ugliness, decay, or whatnot. And yet the symbol expresses\nthis emotion not by stating the concept, but by evoking it or re-\nminging one of it, through some quality of its own (the symbol's)\nlimited and specific nature."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c007", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c007", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "17", "page_fin": "18", "image_debut": 18, "image_fin": 19, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.7", "titre_corps": "Upon the Nature of Words and Their Use.", "titre_sommaire": "Upon the Nature of Words and Their Use.", "signature_source": "", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 18, "page_imprimee": "17", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.18", "debut_caractere": 353, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2011, "texte": "SECTION IV.\nUpon the Nature of Words and Their Use.\nIt was assumed in the second section of these notes that\nwords had two qualities : sound and meaning; and insofar as we\nare able to trust our sense, this assumption is justified. That a few\nwords (such as articles) partake, in their meaning, more of the\nnature of a gesture or an indication than of a fact, does not alter\nthe general truth of the assumption. In some words one will find\nthat the sound of the word, and the thing for which that word\nstands, are perfectly fused, and constitute an image in themselves.\nSuch words are the nouns, leaves, dresses, dust, breath. The\nword, drum, if not quite so perfect a fusion, is very nearly so;\nand after noting the sound and meaning qualities of this word,\nccnsider the word, dumb, the sound of which is nearly identical\nwith that of drum, and the meaning of which, insofar as it is a\nword of silence, is the opposite. Here the sound and meaning are\ndefinitely not fused, and a problem is presented to the writer. The\nthere are words that represent abstractions, whose meanings have\nno relationship to anything physical, and so can have no aesthetic\nnecessity — that is, if the sound of any word can be proven to be\nother than accidental. Such a word is, for instance, hypocritic.\nNow consider these lines :\nDaughters of Time, the hypocritic days,\nMuffled and dumb like barefoot dervishes,\nAnd marching single in an endless file,\nBring diadems and fagots in their hands.\nDumb, whose meaning is opposed to its sound, fuses its\nsound with the two sense-perceptions, muffled and barefoot, and\nextends and intensifies these perceptions. The sound of hypocritic,"}, {"page_pdf": 19, "page_imprimee": "18", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.19", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 271, "texte": "an abstract word, presentes the short, bony, half-dance steps of\nthe muffled dervishes. Diadems, a heavy-sounding word that\nstands for a bright object, fuses its sound with the muffled move-\nment; and fagots, fairly well fused in itself, also contributes to\nthe movement."}]}, {"article_id": "bm-bmtnaay-1924-02-c008", "article_bluemountain": "bmtnaay_1924_02#c008", "volume": "bmtnaay_1924_02", "ocr_source": "OCR Blue Mountain (ALTO), transcription TEI : lignes lb/@facs", "texte_sans_correction": true, "page_debut": "18", "page_fin": "20", "image_debut": 19, "image_fin": 21, "pages_selon": "pagination imprimée relevée dans le METS Blue Mountain (ORDERLABEL) ; [n] = page sans folio restituée", "url_article": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.2.8", "titre_corps": "Upon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image.", "titre_sommaire": "Upon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image.", "signature_source": "Ivor Winters", "controle": "bornes données par la structure logique METS/ALTO de Blue Mountain (blocs ALTO de chaque constituant)", "pages": [{"page_pdf": 19, "page_imprimee": "18", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.19", "debut_caractere": 273, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1714, "texte": "SECTION V.\nUpon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image.\n\nIt is assumed that the parts of any poem have some reason\nfor being placed in sequence. Otherwise they had better be left\nas separate poems.\nIn some poems, especially in narrative poems, one sometimes\nfinds passages that, without great emotional value in themselves,\nserve to carry the action or thought from one image to another,\nand in this function may be necessary :\nAnd a good south wind sprung up behind;\nThe Albatross did follow,\nAnd every day, for food or play,\nCame to the mariners' hollo.\nThe sound here does not fuse with the physical facts, nor is\nthere any fusion between physical nor can there be said to\nbe any intercomment of perceptions. But this purely narrative\npassage has been made as concise as possible, and, being short,\nthe rhythm, being the rhythm of the preceding stanzas which are\nsuccessful images, carries something of an echo over into what\nwould be an otherwise flat stanza. Often the first type of image\nwill carry a narrative passage, or one of the types of anti-image\na thought passage. Sometimes one of these purely narrative pass-\nages will come very close to being an image or anti-image.\nOften a poem or a passage of a poem is made up of images\nthat are closely related, or are sub-parts of a larger image, so that\nthe poem or passage closely resembles an extended example of\nthe second variation upon the second type of image."}, {"page_pdf": 20, "page_imprimee": "19", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.20", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 2143, "texte": "Sometimes a definite emotion is produced by a sudden change\nof direction (in images of motion) from one image to the next.\nNote the last line of the first chorus in Swinburne's Atalanta. The\ndeparting image produces an effect of a somewhat centripetal\nnature.\nImages of contrasting symbolic values may be so placed\ntogether that intercomment is achieved. T. S. Eliot has done\nthis in Sweeney among the Nightingales and elsewhere.\nOne image of any type may act upon and limit another\nimage, as one part of the third type of image acts upon and\nlimits the other part.\nMany poets have entirely omitted any intellectual sequence\nfrom one image to the next, depending upon an emotional unity,\nand there is nothing to be said against this. Other poets have\natempted to carry the method even further, omitting all intellectual\n(syntactical) sequence within the image, or trying to, attempting\nto create aesthetic relationships from broken words and phrases.\nThis is interesting, and may some day succeed. The difficulty with\nmost of these experimenters up to date, however, is that, having\ncast out all other thought from their minds, they cannot cast out\nthe cliches, the very old sentimentalities, which seem to be so\ndeeply rooted as to be almost mental reflexes. Their poems be-\ncome, then, desperate efforts to conceal these cliches under a\nbroken exterior, which is evading the question.\nPoetry of this nature is often compared to abstract painting\nor sculpture, and praised for this reason and for few others. And\nyet, if we reduce literature to complete abstraction — that is,\nsound without meaning — we no longer have literature, but\nmusic, and we must either adopt the notation of music or else\nadopt a new system of notation to provide for intonation as well\nas vowel and consonant sounds. And if we do not so reduce\nliterature we inevitably retain an element of representation, how-\never broken up and distorted. That is, if we imagine a potential\nsculptor, let us say, living in some strange realm where he is\nable to experience no sense-impressions — even impressions of\nhis own body or any part of it — except impressions of that which"}, {"page_pdf": 21, "page_imprimee": "20", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.21", "debut_caractere": 0, "fin_caractere_exclue": 1878, "texte": "he may be able to create out of some imponderable substance that\nwill take form as soon as definitely imagined, he will be able to\nimagine nothing, for he will have no concept of form, solidity.\nIndeed, he is very likely to be entirely unconscious. But give him\na pebble — which will bring him to consciousness — and he will\nbe able to imagine another pebble, and variations upon pebbles,\nand further variations upon those variations until he creates a\nworld and an art. And having created a world of variations that\nno longer resemble each other closely, he may be able to resyn-\nthesize various forms into new forms that do not as a whole re-\nsemble anyhing in his world, but they will inevitably by repre-\nsentative in some degree, of whatever number of fragments of\nwhatever number of things. And the steps between this type of\nart and the type that will in some definitely recognizable degree\nresemble a definite one of his variations upon the original pebble\nwill be infinite in number and the differences between them infi-\nnitely slight. So that one can only say that piece of sculpture is\ngood which depends upon its form and not upon its resemblance\nto something else ; and one can not say truly that is best which\nresembles no natural form, for their is no such thing. Similarly,\nthat poetry is good which is a perfect fusion of perceptions, and\nthat which is an imperfect fusion of perceptions or depends mainly\nupon symbolical or other connotations is, to that extent, weak.\nThe poet wishing to write «abstract» poetry of this type,\nmust not dispense with all thought, then, and write without con-\nsideration, for this will only lead him into the cliches mentioned\nabove; but he must choose carefully the material which he wishes\nto break up and recombine, and work with at least as definite an\nintention and consciousness as any sculptor or painter.\n\nIvor Winters."}]}], "pages_ocr_originales": [{"page_pdf": 2, "page_imprimee": "1", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.2", "texte": "THE TESTAMENT OF A STONE\nBEING\nNOTES ON THE MECHANICS OF THE POETIC IMAGE\n\nCONTENTS\nForeword i\nSection I. ........ c\nDefinition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.\nSection 11. ..... ..... 7\nTypes of Perception.\nSection 111. ......... 8\nTypes of the Image and anti-Image.\nSection IV. . . . . . . 17\nUpon the Nature of Words and their Use.\nSection V. ....... ... 18\nUpon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image.\n\nFOREWORD.\nThese notes presuppose a knowledge of Fenollosa's The Chinese Written Character, a\nlarge part of T. S. Eliot s The Sacred Wood, and scattered paragraphs from Pound, Lewis, Croce,\nand the Hindus.\nI reserve the right to add to or alter these notes later in case of any second publication.\nIt is possible that they are not complete (the last section is obviously incomplete, as my interest in\nit is temporarily secondary), but ihey are an attempt to incite the beginnings of a scientific criti-\ncism of poetry, which up to dale we do not have, except in a few scattered fragments.\nThe poet himself will be more sensitive to, or more moved\nby, some material than other material, will perceive it more com-\npletely, and so will write his best poems when dealing with it.\nSpeculation upon the sensitivity of the individual poet and its\npossible modification by his environment is of some psycholo-\ngical interest and perhaps more ((human interest)), but it has\nlittle to do with the art of poetry. The degree of fusion of the\nparts of a poem will depend upon the degree of fusion of the poet\nwith his material, and that, to be sure, is the result of the nature"}, {"page_pdf": 3, "page_imprimee": "2", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.3", "texte": "of his sensitivity and his environment. But one is usually — and\ntheoretically — forced by circumstances to approach the poet and\nhis environment — if one so desires — through his poems, and\nnot the other way round. Supposing one to be possessed of some\nintelligence, it is possible, after a reasonable amount of study, to\ndecide whether a poem represent a perfect fusion of perceptions\nor not, and supposing one to have some education, it is possible,\nafter similar study, to decide whether the poem be original or me-\nrely a restatement of the perceptions of others. As different poets\nare moved equally by different types of material, finished poems,\ncomposed of different types of material, may be equally intense;\nthus indicating that the material is of no importance to the critic,\nwho is dealing with poems; but only to the poet, who is dealing\nwith material, and that is his own affair.\nThe cause of a perfectly fused poem is the fusion of the poet s\nconsciousness with an object or a group of objects of whatever na-\nture. The means by which this fusion is achieved is the poet s\n((technique)). In the mature poet, the technique is the medium of\nfusion; and the ratio of what the poet sees or feels to what he\ngets down is in direct proportion to the perfection of his techni-\nque. Why one poet is moved by this and another by that, it is\nimpossible to say. It is possible only to remark the fact. But tech-\nnique can be analysed, and analysed minutely; and this analysis\nmay be of value to other poets in perfecting and extending the\nrange of their perceptions, and it may be of value to critics, private\nand public, insofar as it may make them more acutely aware of\ntheir poets' achievements.\nA poem is a state of perfection at which a poet has arrived\nby whatever means. It is a stasis in a world of flux and indecision,\na permanent gateway to waking oblivion, which is the only in-\nfinity and the only rest. It has no responsibilities except to itself\nand its own perfection — neither to the man who may come to it\nwith imperfect understanding nor to the mood from which it may\noriginally have sprung. It is not a means to any end, but is in\nitself an end, and it, or one of the other embodiments of beauty,\nis the only end possible to the man of intellect.\nThe artist whose deity is art, has a religion as valid and as\ncapable of producing great art as any religion of the past or as"}, {"page_pdf": 4, "page_imprimee": "3", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.4", "texte": "the recently defined religion of money. As a conscious and intel-\nligent being, no other religion will be possible for him, and he\ncannot, because of his religion, be called a decadent, an heretic.\nDriven into a corner of which we are unaware, we pursue our\nends. For in infinity, those who withdraw in terror are those who\ndrive us off with bitterness, and at the same instant, in the same\nthought and gesture. Yet equanimity is all we seek.\nA poem is the result of a poet moving in a millieu. A poet\nis born into a certain intellectual and physical milieu, and this\nmilieu may, to some extent, form the poet. But the poet will also\nbe born with certain peculiar and unchangeable qualities, and\nthese will, in the course of time, modify the milieu with respect\nto the particular poet. If the poet be of a very plastic nature, he\nmay be greatly changed by his milieu. If he be of a more or less\nimmobile nature, he will absorb into his own mind, and, in the\nprocess of obsorption, change as becomes necessary, such part of\nhis milieu as is to some extent forced upon him.\nA poet's technique is a portion of the milieu into which he\nis born (tradition) modified by his peculiar qualities to serve their\nneeds.\nThe milieu of any place and time is a relatively constant\nfactor. The peculiar qualities of individual poets are infinitely va-\nriable. The resulting milieu of the individual poet is therefore\ninfinitely variable. So it is infantile to say that a poet (( does not\ninterpret his time », to demand that he write in any specified man-\nner. It is infantile to say that he can do this or that only with this\nor that technique. The individual can only say truly, « I can do\nthis or that only with this or that technique». And even then\nhe cannot be too sure.\nSo that the poem can be judged, not in relation to any time\nor place, nor to any mode of thought, but to itself alone, and as a\npart of literature; for it is not a means, but an end. The mind\nthat can judge a poem accurately is very rare — even more rare\nthan the mind that can create a poem. For this act of weighing\nrequires a mind infinitely balanced, infinitely sensitive, and infi-"}, {"page_pdf": 5, "page_imprimee": "4", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.5", "texte": "nitely familiar with all the technical phases of the medium. Such\na mind is, with one exception in a thousand, the mind of the\nmaster poet.\nThe intellectual poet is often accused of obscurity, merely\nbecause his reader is unfamiliar with the milieu in which he\nmoves. If we imagine a poet writing in our own language but\non a remote planet, whose vegetation and population, whose en-\ntire physical aspect, are different from anything we know, and ex-\npressing himself largely in terms of the physical, we cannot ima-\ngine ourselves receiving from his poems more than a very blurred\nimpression. So is the poet moving in a world that is largely com-\nposed of thought and otherwise greatly modified by thought, to\nthe reader unacquainted with the philosophies.\nThe poet moving in a world that is largely thought, so long\nas he regard it curiously and as a world, perceives a grassblade.\nThese specific things are the material of the image, of art. When\nhe loses his sense of the infinite nature of his world and organizes\nit into a knowable and applicable principle, he loses sight of the\nparticulars themselves and sees their relationships to each other\nand his newly-created whole ; and so becomes a philosopher; for\nit is only in the infinite that the particular can be detected as a\ncomplete and uncoordinated whole; but he may still have oc-\ncasional perceptions, and at times revert to the poet. When he\nbecomes more interested in the application of his principle, in its\npossible effects, than in the principle itself, he becomes a preacher\nand is lost; for now he not only thinks in generalities instead of\nin perceptions, but he attempts to save a humanity that he cannot\npossibly understand by fitting it into a mutilated fragment of an\ninfinity whose nature he once felt, but could never understand,\nand has now forgotten.\nThe poet, in creating, must lose himself in his object. If he\nbecomes more interested in himself observing than in his object,\nand still continues to write about his object rather than himself\nobserving, he will create a mannerism but no image. It is from\nthis weakness that the various familiar pretty and paternal man-\nnerisms arise. Such a mannerism may be held down to the point\nof producing poetry of whatever degree of impurity, or it may not."}, {"page_pdf": 6, "page_imprimee": "5", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.6", "texte": "The poet who is preoccupied with his object desires a speech\nwithout idiom and a style without mannerism, that the clarity of\nhis perception may not be clouded by inessentials. In any abso-\nlute sense, both are impossible, but both can be closely approxi-\nmated.\nPerhaps it is true that the poet, moving through his world,\nreaches, for chemical or other reasons, a point of spiritual in-\ntensity, and that those objects that fall under his eye or his mind's\neye at this point are transformed into something simpler and\ngreater than actuality, withor without his consciousness of any\nsequence save the actual sequence of their appearance; that the\nreproduction of this simplification in words will reproduce in the\nreader the original emotion or point of intensity. Perhaps it is\ntrue that the poet, moving throught his world, becomes aware of\nbeautiful existences, and being moved by them to a sufficient point\nof intensity, is able to reproduce them in words with sufficient ac-\ncuracy to create in his reader the emotion which they created in\nhim. Or perhaps, and this is probably nearer to the truth, he is\nsufficiently moved by certain beautiful existences, to be able to\ncreate other beautiful existences ; and this approaches T. S. Eliot's\nanalogy of the catalyst, and his ((significant emotion)), which is\nprobably the only sound statement of the creative process that\nwe have.\nAll functions of man save the creation of art and pure though\ntend to complicate his physical life without simplifying his mlental\nlife. The sciences, as abstractions, might have the same value\nas art. Indescriminately applied, they have wrecked the world.\n\nSECTION I.\nDefinition of Observation, Perception, Image, and anti-Image.\nIt has been said that art is an elimination of the superfluous,\nbut this statement is capable of several interpretations. It is cer-\ntain, however, that the poetic image is an elimination of the su-\nperfluous in a definite and fundamental sense. Everyone of wha-\ntever degree of intelligence, walking about the world, sees certain"}, {"page_pdf": 7, "page_imprimee": "6", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.7", "texte": "things : trees growing, their leaves and branches moving in the\nwind; bees flying across fields; men and women working in the\nfields or walking in the streets or moved by various passions and\nemotions. These sights and others of a similar nature may be\ncalled observation. If I say : « I saw a man walking », or : « 1 saw\nnight come », it will convey no sharp or lasting impression to the\nbrain of the listener. It is a general statement, which is a vague\nstatement, like a mist without form, a block of unhewn granite,\na chaos.\nBut there are persons who see those things which differen-\ntiate one observation from another : they see the outline in the\nmist. The vision of this outline may be called perception. And\nthere are yet other persons, fewer in number and of finer vision,\nwho can take the outline from the mist and make it stand alone.\nThis is done, in poetry, by seeing and placing in juxtaposition two\nor more observations that have one quality in common : that is,\neach of these observations will be differentiated from other obser-\nvations of its class by the same perception; and when these obser-\nvations are placed together they will fuse at the point where they\nare the same, or, to be more exact, they will be the same at one\npoint. These two perceptions, coming together with an almost\ninfinite speed across the mental distances that naturally lie bet-\nween two separate obserbations (such as a man walking and the\nccmmg of night) cause a kind of mental vibration that is known as\naesthetic emotion. Or, to state it in another fashion, this fusion,\ncr sameness at one point in two observations, reinforces that point,\nand makes it stand out as clearly above the vaguenesses of the\ntwo observations as those two observations stand out above a state\nof no-observation or unconsciousness. And perhaps these two sta-\ntements of the phenomenon are not incompatible. This phenome-\nnon may be called an image. The image, in the case of the two\nobservations used as examples, is :\nAt one stride comes the darli.\nThe quotation may help to clear the ground.\nThe image, so defined, being a fusion of sense-perceptions,\npresents the emotion : that is, the emotion is seen in the concrete\nand acts directly, without the aid of thought, just as the sight\nof a tree registers directly, without the aid of thought. But it is"}, {"page_pdf": 8, "page_imprimee": "7", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.8", "texte": "possible in thinking of observations, to find intellectual correla-\ntions that are not evident to the simple senses, but that may\ntransmit an aesthetic emotion, not directly, as in the case of sense\nperceptions, but through the intellect. Here the emotion is trans-\nmitted by intercomment, rather than by fusion. This phenomenon\nmay be called the anti-image, as the sense-impressions of the\nobservations do not here fuse at any point. It will be noted that\nthe anti-image, where a physical fusion is not intended, is dif-\nferent from an attempted image, or fusion of sense-perceptions\nthat is not successful.\nAs the image and anti-image make a sharp and lasting im-\npression on the brain, and as the simple observation does not,\nthe image and anti-image stay, and the observations disappear;\nand this is the process of elimination that was alluded to above.\nIt is that quality in an observation of the approach of night that\nis different from any other observation of the approach of night,\nthat gives such an observation a life of its own. And it is this\ndifferentiating, or unique, quality in any observation, that, when\npresented permanently, by means of an image or anti-image, is\nknown as beauty.\nThe terms, observation, perception, and image, may have\nbeen used at various times with meanings slightly different from\nthose I have given them ; but I have applied them to certain phe-\nnomena, defined as clearly as I can define them, for lack of better\nterms. The phenomena seem to me sufficiently distinguishable\nfrom one another. It may be argued that a perception, as I have\ndefined it, does not really exist until it becomes an image; but\nthis possibility can be taken into consideration without disturbing\nthe trend of my discussion. The anti-image is the only pure lo-\ngopeia ; but as the term logopeia has been applied in ways that\ndo not seem to me accurate, I shall not here use it.\n\nSECTION II.\nTypes of Perception.\nPerceptions may be divided into two general types : those\nperceptions which are expressed in the sound of words, and those\nperceptions which are expressed in the meaning of words.\nThe first of these types will be referred to in this essay as"}, {"page_pdf": 9, "page_imprimee": "8", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.9", "texte": "sound-perceptions. Sound perceptions possess two qualities : tone\nand rhythm. The first of these is the quality of individual vowel\nor consonant or syllabic sounds. The second is the rate and va-\nriation of movement from tone to tone. It will be seen that tone\nand rhythm are inseparable, but occasionally one or the other\nseems to predominate. This results from a perfect or nearly perfect\nfusion of the predominant sound quality with the meaning of the\nwords, and an imperfect fusion of the other sound quality. Insofar\nas this is true of any poem, that poem will be imperfect.\nPerfections which are expressed in the meaning of words\nmay be called meaning-perceptions. They fall roughly into two\nclasses : perceptions of concrete facts of which one becomes aware\nthrough the simple senses, and which may be called sense-percep-\ntions; and perceptions of abstract facts or qualities — that is, of\nfacts or qualities which are imperceptible to the unaided senses —\nof which one becomes aware through thinking about a concrete\nor abstract fact, and which may be called thought-perceptions.\n\nSECTION III.\nTypes of the Image and anti-Image.\n1.\nThere is the simple physical movement, not «caught» in\nany fusion of the meaning of words, but rather in a fusion of the\nsound of words and a simple statement of the movement — in\nthe fusion of the sound perception and a simple meaning percep-\ntion. The movement has no necessary connotations as a move-\nment : that is, it is not a movement one thinks of as having any\nrelationship to sorrow, joy, or ecstasy. But any unemotional phys-\nical movement, stated cleanly and in psychological order, in a\nrhythm that fuses with that movement, may become a profound\nimage. By fusing with the movement, 1 do not mean that the\nrhythm should imitate with its own movement the physical mo-\nvement that it contains, bu* rather that it should purify that mo-\nvement as it appears in actual physical life, giving it a regularity"}, {"page_pdf": 10, "page_imprimee": "9", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.10", "texte": "or at least organized variation of beat, and usually greatly acce-\nlerating it; so that the movement takes on something of the na\nture of a dance movement, but again is much purer and swifter\nthan even a dance movement, by nature of its limitations, can be.\nFrom this last it may be seen that a movement that has been\npurified and formalized to a certain extent in actual life, such as\na dance or religious procession, and which has, therefore, a certain\nemotional connotation in itself, can be further formalized, purified,\nin a poem, so that it takes on a new significance — even if that\nnew significance be only a variation upon the purification already\neffected in the dance or religious procession. There are also mo-\nvements in actual life that are expressions or semi-expression of\nemotion, such as joy, sorrow, etc., and these may, as well as\nother movements, be given form simply by a rhythm ; but the\ndanger here lies in the temptation offered to the weak, at least,\nto be content with a lax rhythm and to trust to the connotations\nof the movement to <( put hover » the emotion ; which is akin to\nthe use of an inherited symbolism or any other sentimentality.\nThe pure form of this type of image, that is, the physical move-\nment without connotations, animated merely by a rhythm, is apt\nto produce the cleanest beauty. The last-named form of the image\nseems to me the least desirable, as it cannot possibly be freed from\nat least a taint of sentimentality, though this taint, in certain cases\nand if handled by a master, may have a value.\nWe may, for lack of a shorter name, call the type of image\ndiscussed in the last paragraph, the simple physical movement\nfused with a rhythm. This image seems to occur most often in\nrhymed poems that move to a fixed metre. There seems to be a\ncumulative effect, sometimes, in the still-echoing rhythm of se-\nveral preceding stanzas. The same cumulative effect may come\nin poems whose metre varies as much as or less than, say, that\nof the Ancient Mariner. It would, I should think, be difficult to\nproduce this cumulative effect in a meter not having a large\namount of repetition; and certainly the reinforcement of rhyme\nis an aid; but the use of the simple physical movement fused with\na rhythm does not depend upon cumulative rhythm. Cumulative\nrhythm is merely a possible modification, or, sometimes, intensi-\nfication.\nTwo of the finest examples of this image that I know —\nexamples of the physical movement without, in itself, any emo-"}, {"page_pdf": 11, "page_imprimee": "10", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.11", "texte": "tional connotations — are in the openin of T. Gautier's Les Affres\nde la Mort:\nO toi qui passes par ce cloitre,\nSonge a la mort! — Tun est pas sur\nDe Voir s'allonger et decroitre,\nUne autre jois, ton ombre au mur.\nbrere, peut-etre cette dalle\nQu'aujourd'hui, sans songer aux morts,\nTu soufflettes de ta sandale,\nDemain pesera sur ton corps !\nThe physical movement here is in the first, third, and fourth\nlines of the first stanza, and in the third line of the second stanza.\nThese lines are slightly modified from without by the « Songe a\nla mort! », but the modification is slight and not such as to cloud\ntheir value as examples. Another example of this type of image\nin one of its less pure forms is to be found in the latter half of\nGerard Hopkins' The Habit of Perfection:\nO feel-of-primrose hands, O feet\nThat want the yield of plushy sward,\nBut you shall wal\\ the golden street,\nAnd you unhouse and house the Lord.\nThe last two lines show the purification in verse of a move-\nment that has already been purified in life as a religious symbol.\nH. D. has achieved in free verse animations of physical move-\nments that have no emotional connotations :\n/ saw the first pear\nas it fell —\nthe honey-seeding, golden-banded,\nthe yellow swarm\nwas not more fleet than I,\n(spare us from loveliness)\nand I fell prostrate\ncrying:..."}, {"page_pdf": 12, "page_imprimee": "11", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.12", "texte": "The movement of the first two lines has in itself no emo-\ntional connotation whatever, the movement of the next three lines\nhas infinitely little, and the movement of the seventh and eigth\nIms have a very definite one. All three are handled successfully\nand have their place in the poem.\nThe simple physical movement fused with a rhythm is the\ncommonest variation of the simple physical fact fused with a\nrhythm, which may or may not have movement. This image\nneed not be visual.\n1 .a.\nThe statement of simple thought, or the statement of\na simple physical fact, punctuated or commented upon by a\nrhythm, is the simplest form of what Pound has roughly classed\nas logopeia, and of what I have called the anti-image. A rhythm\nthat has traditional associations, or innate (i.e., more remote\nor not immediately obviously traditional) associations, or one that\nhas acquired associations in the given poem, by previous fusion,\nmay comment upon its meaning-content either by contrast or\naugmentation. It will be seen that each type of image has its\nconverse, or anti-image, and this first type of anti-image is the\nconverse of the simple physical fact fused with a rhythm. La-\nforgue achieves this anti-image by putting a ridiculous fact into\na traditionally plaintive metre, or by putting a sentimental or tragic\nfact into a ridiculous metre, or by various shadings between these\ntwo extremes. The result is one phase of his rather mournful\nsatire :\nAllez, sterile ritournelles,\nLa vie est Vraie et criminelle.\n2.\nThe second type of image is the complex physical fact\nfused with a rhythm. This is the same as the first type of image,\nexcept that here the fusion is between two or more sense-percep-"}, {"page_pdf": 13, "page_imprimee": "12", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.13", "texte": "tions and one sound-perception. The line quoted in Section I of\nthese notes belonged to this type of image, and also the third,\nfourth, and fifth lines of the quotation from H. D. (if taken as a\nunit). There are various devices for constructing an image of this\nsort, some of which I shall describe, that the image, when come\nupon, may be the more easily recognized.\nFirst: The direct comparison of sense-perceptions, as in the\nso-called metaphor and simile. The line quoted in Section I is of\nthis nature.\nSecond : The putting of two sense-perceptions in sequence,\nso that while they have no direct or grammatically indicated con-\nnection with each other, each reflects upon the other because of\nthe quality they have in common :\nSo wore night; the East was gray;\nWhite the broadfaced hemlock flowers—\nMovements may be similarly put into sequence :\nAnd Neptune made for thee a spumy tent,\nAnd Pan made sing for thee his forest hive,\nHere the first line is a fusion two sense-perceptions with one\nsound-perception, and the movement of the sound-perception,\ncarrying with it an echo of the «spumy tent», holds over and\ndies into the movement of the humming bees.\nThird : An adjective, being a generalization taken from a\nseries of more or less related observations, may, if appleid to a\nmore or less remote observation, effect a fusion. This is the «trans-\nferred epithet » of rethoric :\nthe parakeet —\ntrivial and humdrum on examination\nFourth : It is perhaps not amiss to mention a certain fallacy\nfairly common to a large number of secondrate but occasionally\ngood poets when they attempt to use this image. That fallacy is\nan attempt to give existence in that which we perceive as space\nto a perception that has no such existence, and to fuse this per-\nception with that side of a second perception which actually exists\nin space. Or, to speak more concretely, to fuse, in the meaning\nof words, a perception of sound and some visual perception,"}, {"page_pdf": 14, "page_imprimee": "13", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.14", "texte": "usually color. Now it seems that certain persons do sense a re-\nlationship between colors and sounds, but it is also certain that\nmany of the persons who do so, disagree among themselves as\nto the details of this relationship. And even if it were possible\nto find an absolute ration, mathematical or perceptive, between\nsound waves, which move slowly through the air, and the hypo-\nthetical (and doubtful) light waves which move with terrific rapi-\ndity through an imponderable substance known as ether, it would\nnot necessarily follow that related emotions would be produced\nby related waves, for these waves are perceived through entirely\ndifferent organs, and the organs of perception are obviously factors\nof the emotion. Furthermore, as I have already inferred, sound\nas We perceive it, has no existence in space, but only in time, or\nwhat we perceive as time; for it is only that which is seen that\ncan be said to fill space, which is a purely visual concept. But\nthe visual, if it have existence in space, has also existence in time,\nand this existence is more evident if the visual perception have\nmotion, which is a relation between space and time, and still\nmore evident if that motion have rhythm, which is time consciously\nbroken up and organized with respect to those existences and their\nintervals that it contains. Now sound, having existence in time,\ncan also have rhythm. So it follows that whereas the auditory and\nthe visual will have no common ground in that which we know as\nspace, they will have a common ground in that which we know\nas time, and that common ground is rhythm — the actual rhythm\nof the thing perceived, and not the rhythm of the words contain-\ning the thing. Now if an auditory and a visual rhythm be stated\nin the meaning of words, a fusion may be possible :\nAnd li\\e a giant harp that hums\nOn always, and is always blending\nThe coming of what never comes\nWith what has past and had an ending,\nThe City trembles, throbs, and pounds\nOutside, and through a thousand sounds\nThe small intolerable drums\nOf Time are li\\e slow drops descending.\nHere the rhythm of the sound of the « drums of Time » and\nthe rhythm of the motion of the drops fuse."}, {"page_pdf": 15, "page_imprimee": "14", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.15", "texte": "It must be recollected that in speaking of the rhythm of a\nsound, or rather of sounds, in this connection, 1 do not refer to\nthe rhythm of sound waves, which belong to science and not to\nunaided human perception; but I refer to the rhythm or rate of\nmovement from sound to sound, as those sounds actually strike,\nor may be imagined to strike, the ear. And similarly, I refer to\nactual visual perception of rhythm and not to the rhythm of\nlight waves, which is imperceptible, as such, to the eye.\n2.a.\nThe anti-image corresponding to the complex physical fact\nfused with a rhythm is of four possible sorts. In the first sort,\nthat of two thought-perceptions and one sound perception, a fu-\nsion of the thought-perceptions is possible, as they are of the\nsame substance. But these thought perceptions, having no phy-\nsical existence, cannot fuse, but can only comment upon each\nother through the mind. The only example of this variation upon\nthe second anti-image that I can find at present is in a poem of\nmy own :\nWe perish, we\nWho die in art,\nWith that surprise\nOf one who speaks\nTo us, and knows\nWherein he lies.\nThe second variation upon this anti-image is composed of\none sense-perception, one thought-perception, and one sound-\nperception intercommenting :\nStreets that follow li\\e a tedious argument\nOf insidious intent,\nTo lead you to an overwhelming question.\nThe third variation is of two sense-perceptions which may\nor may not fuse, and one sound-perception that comments. The\nfourth variation is composed of two remotely separate facts, at\nleast one of which must be physical and which fuses with the"}, {"page_pdf": 16, "page_imprimee": "15", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.16", "texte": "rhythm and takes on an image existence of its own, as in the case\nof the simple physical fact fused with a rhythm. The unfused\nfact comments. This is som,!stimes known as the conceit. An\nexample of the conceit is Donne's comparison of two souls to a\npair of compasses, toward the end of the Valediction Forbidding\nMourning.\n3.\nThere is a third type of image that seems to fall about half-\nway between the first and second types that I have defined.\nThis image is composed of two physical facts, each fused with\nthe sound, and, while neither fused with each other nor com-\nmenting upon each other, altering and defining each other's value\nquite definitely, simply by the juxtaposition of their physical qua-\nlities or by the action of the one upon the other :\nThe maidens taste\nAnd stray impassioned in the littering leaves.\nThe straying maidens and the littering leaves are here the\nphysical facts. They have no point in common, as had the walking\nman and the approaching night of the first example, but they\ndo fuse into a single movement, a single image, of which the\nsound of the whole is a part. And by that fusion, each is sharply\nlimited, separated from the general.\n3.a.\nThe corresponding anti-image is of two thought-perceptions\nplaced together, and the one acting upon the other, to such\nan extent as to effect the defining of both, without any attempt\nat fusion or intercomment at one point :\nthe future of time is determined by the power of volition."}, {"page_pdf": 17, "page_imprimee": "16", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.17", "texte": "4.\nA perception — almost invariably a sense-perception — that\nhas acquired, by long association or by personal association\nor by personal association for whatever period of time, an emo-\ntional overtone or symbolic value, may be used in a poem, so\nlong as it be given in the poem a new existence as image or anti-\nimage. If the fusion or intercomment necessary to this existence\nbe not achieved, the symbolic value of the perception is useless as\nthe perception is without life. If, however, the perception be given\nthis existence, the symbolism may augment the emotion of the\nimage considerably, and the emotion resulting from the symbolism\ncan scarcely be separated in the mind from the emotion resulting\nfrom the image. The symbolical overtone is more or less analagous\nto what is known in painting as ((literary)) beauty.\nThere are symbols in literature whose symbolic value is evi-\ndent, and there are those whose symbolic value is only in pare\nevident, and still others the mere existence of whose symbolic\nvalue is only implied. Glenway Wescott once wrote in a letter:\n<(the legitimate field of movement clearly seen, intention un-\nknown ».\nSymbolism is commonly thought of as something vaguely\nmetaphysical, but it need not be. Any fact or object which sums\nup or evokes any set of conditions or emotions, whatever their\nnature, is to some extent a symbol. Thus T. S. Eliot s Sweeny is\nsymbolic of a certain type of ugliness, Rachel nee Rabinovitch\nand the rest are symbolic of certain smaller divisions of that\nugliness. Mr. Eliot gives movements to these figures that are very\noften of a quite impersonal nature — that is, they are movements\nthat are in no wise connected with their ugliness or are presented\nwith a curious detachment from their ugliness; and these mo-\nvements are usually of supreme sinuosity and beauty. So that,\nby placing these symbols of ugliness in contrast to the impersonal\nbeauty of the movements of their flesh, he achieves at a single\nstroke the functions of the image and the anti-image — some-\nthing that hovers between satire and agony.\nThe symbol must not be confused with the physical move-\nment having emotional connotations, or expressing emotion ; for"}, {"page_pdf": 18, "page_imprimee": "17", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.18", "texte": "the latter is concerned with specific instonces only, while the\nformer is expressive of a concept or whole field of emotion, such\nas ugliness, decay, or whatnot. And yet the symbol expresses\nthis emotion not by stating the concept, but by evoking it or re-\nminging one of it, through some quality of its own (the symbol's)\nlimited and specific nature.\n\nSECTION IV.\nUpon the Nature of Words and Their Use.\nIt was assumed in the second section of these notes that\nwords had two qualities : sound and meaning; and insofar as we\nare able to trust our sense, this assumption is justified. That a few\nwords (such as articles) partake, in their meaning, more of the\nnature of a gesture or an indication than of a fact, does not alter\nthe general truth of the assumption. In some words one will find\nthat the sound of the word, and the thing for which that word\nstands, are perfectly fused, and constitute an image in themselves.\nSuch words are the nouns, leaves, dresses, dust, breath. The\nword, drum, if not quite so perfect a fusion, is very nearly so;\nand after noting the sound and meaning qualities of this word,\nccnsider the word, dumb, the sound of which is nearly identical\nwith that of drum, and the meaning of which, insofar as it is a\nword of silence, is the opposite. Here the sound and meaning are\ndefinitely not fused, and a problem is presented to the writer. The\nthere are words that represent abstractions, whose meanings have\nno relationship to anything physical, and so can have no aesthetic\nnecessity — that is, if the sound of any word can be proven to be\nother than accidental. Such a word is, for instance, hypocritic.\nNow consider these lines :\nDaughters of Time, the hypocritic days,\nMuffled and dumb like barefoot dervishes,\nAnd marching single in an endless file,\nBring diadems and fagots in their hands.\nDumb, whose meaning is opposed to its sound, fuses its\nsound with the two sense-perceptions, muffled and barefoot, and\nextends and intensifies these perceptions. The sound of hypocritic,"}, {"page_pdf": 19, "page_imprimee": "18", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.19", "texte": "an abstract word, presentes the short, bony, half-dance steps of\nthe muffled dervishes. Diadems, a heavy-sounding word that\nstands for a bright object, fuses its sound with the muffled move-\nment; and fagots, fairly well fused in itself, also contributes to\nthe movement.\n\nSECTION V.\nUpon the Construction of the Poem, with Relation to the Image.\n\nIt is assumed that the parts of any poem have some reason\nfor being placed in sequence. Otherwise they had better be left\nas separate poems.\nIn some poems, especially in narrative poems, one sometimes\nfinds passages that, without great emotional value in themselves,\nserve to carry the action or thought from one image to another,\nand in this function may be necessary :\nAnd a good south wind sprung up behind;\nThe Albatross did follow,\nAnd every day, for food or play,\nCame to the mariners' hollo.\nThe sound here does not fuse with the physical facts, nor is\nthere any fusion between physical nor can there be said to\nbe any intercomment of perceptions. But this purely narrative\npassage has been made as concise as possible, and, being short,\nthe rhythm, being the rhythm of the preceding stanzas which are\nsuccessful images, carries something of an echo over into what\nwould be an otherwise flat stanza. Often the first type of image\nwill carry a narrative passage, or one of the types of anti-image\na thought passage. Sometimes one of these purely narrative pass-\nages will come very close to being an image or anti-image.\nOften a poem or a passage of a poem is made up of images\nthat are closely related, or are sub-parts of a larger image, so that\nthe poem or passage closely resembles an extended example of\nthe second variation upon the second type of image."}, {"page_pdf": 20, "page_imprimee": "19", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.20", "texte": "Sometimes a definite emotion is produced by a sudden change\nof direction (in images of motion) from one image to the next.\nNote the last line of the first chorus in Swinburne's Atalanta. The\ndeparting image produces an effect of a somewhat centripetal\nnature.\nImages of contrasting symbolic values may be so placed\ntogether that intercomment is achieved. T. S. Eliot has done\nthis in Sweeney among the Nightingales and elsewhere.\nOne image of any type may act upon and limit another\nimage, as one part of the third type of image acts upon and\nlimits the other part.\nMany poets have entirely omitted any intellectual sequence\nfrom one image to the next, depending upon an emotional unity,\nand there is nothing to be said against this. Other poets have\natempted to carry the method even further, omitting all intellectual\n(syntactical) sequence within the image, or trying to, attempting\nto create aesthetic relationships from broken words and phrases.\nThis is interesting, and may some day succeed. The difficulty with\nmost of these experimenters up to date, however, is that, having\ncast out all other thought from their minds, they cannot cast out\nthe cliches, the very old sentimentalities, which seem to be so\ndeeply rooted as to be almost mental reflexes. Their poems be-\ncome, then, desperate efforts to conceal these cliches under a\nbroken exterior, which is evading the question.\nPoetry of this nature is often compared to abstract painting\nor sculpture, and praised for this reason and for few others. And\nyet, if we reduce literature to complete abstraction — that is,\nsound without meaning — we no longer have literature, but\nmusic, and we must either adopt the notation of music or else\nadopt a new system of notation to provide for intonation as well\nas vowel and consonant sounds. And if we do not so reduce\nliterature we inevitably retain an element of representation, how-\never broken up and distorted. That is, if we imagine a potential\nsculptor, let us say, living in some strange realm where he is\nable to experience no sense-impressions — even impressions of\nhis own body or any part of it — except impressions of that which"}, {"page_pdf": 21, "page_imprimee": "20", "url_page": "https://bluemountain.princeton.edu/bluemtn/?a=d&d=bmtnaay1924-02.1.21", "texte": "he may be able to create out of some imponderable substance that\nwill take form as soon as definitely imagined, he will be able to\nimagine nothing, for he will have no concept of form, solidity.\nIndeed, he is very likely to be entirely unconscious. But give him\na pebble — which will bring him to consciousness — and he will\nbe able to imagine another pebble, and variations upon pebbles,\nand further variations upon those variations until he creates a\nworld and an art. And having created a world of variations that\nno longer resemble each other closely, he may be able to resyn-\nthesize various forms into new forms that do not as a whole re-\nsemble anyhing in his world, but they will inevitably by repre-\nsentative in some degree, of whatever number of fragments of\nwhatever number of things. And the steps between this type of\nart and the type that will in some definitely recognizable degree\nresemble a definite one of his variations upon the original pebble\nwill be infinite in number and the differences between them infi-\nnitely slight. So that one can only say that piece of sculpture is\ngood which depends upon its form and not upon its resemblance\nto something else ; and one can not say truly that is best which\nresembles no natural form, for their is no such thing. Similarly,\nthat poetry is good which is a perfect fusion of perceptions, and\nthat which is an imperfect fusion of perceptions or depends mainly\nupon symbolical or other connotations is, to that extent, weak.\nThe poet wishing to write «abstract» poetry of this type,\nmust not dispense with all thought, then, and write without con-\nsideration, for this will only lead him into the cliches mentioned\nabove; but he must choose carefully the material which he wishes\nto break up and recombine, and work with at least as definite an\nintention and consciousness as any sculptor or painter.\n\nIvor Winters."}]}